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Abstract. Like many other mountainous countries, Norway
has experienced a rapid increase in both recreational winter
activities and fatalities in avalanche terrain during the past
few decades: during the decade 2008–2017, 64 recreational
avalanche fatalities were recorded in Norway. This is a 106 %
increase from that of the previous decade. In 2013, Nor-
way therefore launched the National Avalanche Warning Ser-
vice (NAWS), which provides avalanche warnings to trans-
port and preparedness authorities and to the public. Previous
studies suggest that avalanche warnings are used extensively
in trip and preparedness planning and have a relatively strong
influence on the decisions people make in order to reduce
risk. However, no evaluation concerning how efficiently the
warnings are communicated and understood has been done to
date in Norway. Avalanche warnings communicate complex
natural phenomena with a variable complexity and level of
uncertainty about both the future and the present. In order to
manage avalanche risk successfully, it is fundamental that the
warning message can be understood and translated into prac-
tice by a wide range of different user groups. Users with little
or no avalanche competence may need simple information to
decide when to stay away from avalanche terrain, while pro-
fessional users may need advanced technical details in order
to make their decisions. To evaluate how different modes of
communication are understood, and how efficiently the infor-
mational content is communicated, we designed and imple-
mented a web-based user survey. The modes of presentation
were based on the Varsom.no 2017 version (Varsom.no being
the national portal for natural hazard warnings in Norway).
We first used a panel of 110 experts from NAWS to answer
the survey, and used their answers to establish the indented
message of the avalanche warning. We thereafter received re-
sponses from 264 users and compared their answers to those
of the NAWS experts for the different modes of communica-
tion. We developed a method, the comprehension effective-
ness score, to test the comprehension. Our empirical anal-
yses suggest that most users find the warning service to be
useful and well suited to their needs. However, the effective-
ness of a warnings seems to be influenced by the competency
of the user and the complexity of the scenarios. We discuss
the findings and make recommendations on how to improve
communication of avalanche warnings.
1 Introduction
Does the Norwegian Avalanche Warning Service effectively
communicate its intended message? Risk communicators
should pursue their intention to assess whether the message
they disseminate is appropriate, understandable and useful
(Charrière and Bogaard, 2016). This is a matter of prime con-
cern during a period of dramatic change in information tech-
nology and information consumption in society. The Inter-
net is rapidly becoming the main source of information, and
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studies show that communication is important: e.g. Brigo et
al. (2016) conclude that Internet campaigns with emotional
content are important to effectively promote awareness pro-
grammes on risk of avalanches and increase public knowl-
edge related to these persistent and serious threats. This study
focuses less on campaigns and more on the avalanche warn-
ings and forecasts published daily by Avalanche Warnings
Services (AWS′).
In this paper we use the terms danger and hazard inter-
changeably. The same applies to the terms forecast, warning
and bulletin.
1.1 Public avalanche warnings
In order to prevent avalanche accidents, AWS′ throughout
the world publish avalanche warnings to the preparedness au-
thorities and the public. The standards for publishing danger
levels and structuring the information in the warnings have
been developed over the years with the aim of providing the
users with a product that is as effective as possible. Most
AWS′ use the systems devised by the European Avalanche
Warning Services (http://www.avalanches.org, last access:
9 September 2018; EAWS, 2017a, Müller et al., 2016) or
the North American AWS′ (https://avalanche.org/, last ac-
cess: 9 September 2018; Statham et al., 2010, 2018). All
AWS′ quantify the danger into five levels (1–5) and use one
or more of these standard elements: (1) a main (flash) mes-
sage, (2) most avalanche-prone terrain (elevation; aspects),
(3) avalanche problems, (4) snow cover and avalanche his-
tory, and (5) avalanche danger assessment and prognosis.
The products from the different AWS′ vary considerably
in degree of detail, use of text, symbols and graphics, de-
gree of advice provided, etc. (Burkeljca, 2013a). However,
most avalanche warnings are typically structured in a stan-
dard journalistic inverted pyramid approach (Scanlan, 2000;
Burkeljca, 2013b), where the most important information
is presented at the top. More detailed and advanced infor-
mation is sequentially presented further down in the pyra-
mid. Accordingly, the standard EAWS approach (see https:
//avalanche.org/, last access: 9 September 2018) presents the
danger level at the top, often accompanied by a flash mes-
sage (a short main message). Secondly, the core zones (the
most avalanche-prone terrain) are pointed out, typically by
describing which elevation intervals and compass directions
(sectors) have the highest danger. At this level, or at the level
below, the current avalanche problems are described, fol-
lowed by a description of the avalanche danger, snow cover
and avalanche history, weather history and prognosis, and fi-
nally observations from the field. The pyramid approach also
reflects what is useful to users at three different levels of
competence (Mitterer et al., 2014): the top level of informa-
tion targets all users, especially beginners with limited ability
to understand and use complex information and users who
want to get the key information quickly, the medium-level
targets users with an intermediate to advanced knowledge of
avalanche and snow assessments, while the detailed bottom
level of information in mainly useful to experts.
The danger level ranges from 1 – low – to 5 – very high
(termed extreme in North America) – and is an expression of
the probability and size of expected avalanches in a given
geographical region over a given period of time. In order
to derive a danger level, the geographical extent should be
above 100 km2 (EAWS, 2017a). It is a generalization over
a larger area, which typically has significant local variabil-
ity (Jamieson et al., 2008; Schweizer et al., 2008; Techel et
al., 2016). The European Avalanche Danger Scale (EADS;
EAWS, 2016) was introduced in 1993 (SLF, 2018) and is
used by all European AWS′ but the Swedish AWS. The
avalanche warning is a prognosis of expected danger over
time, typically a period of 24 h, and is based on an analysis
of the current snow cover and the effects of the weather on
the snow and avalanche conditions during the prognosis pe-
riod. The avalanche problems (Atkins, 2004; Landrø et al.,
2013; Statham et al., 2018) describe the characteristics of
the avalanche danger in more detail: the type of avalanche
(dry or wet, slab or loose), trigger and failure mechanism,
expected terrain locations, predictability and ease of detec-
tion. The level of detail varies between AWS′, as do the num-
ber of categories. Advice for back-country travellers or pre-
paredness authorities is provided by some AWS′, either in
the flash message (what to be aware of or do), as part of the
avalanche problem (specific advice; is the problem manage-
able, and if so, how) or linked to the avalanche danger level
(general advice). The snow cover and avalanche analysis pro-
vides a description of the snow properties and distribution
relevant to avalanche conditions (e.g. snow height, recent
snow fall, surface, wet/dry, critical layers) as well as recently
observed avalanches in the region (e.g. locations, numbers,
sizes, types, failure planes). The avalanche danger assess-
ment provides further details on the avalanche threats, the
distribution within the region, effects of expected weather,
uncertainties, etc.
Introducing the EADS in 1993 as a European standard
(Meister, 1995) improved communication of avalanche dan-
ger, and provided a basis for rule-based management strate-
gies. The danger level is used by many users (Winkler
and Techel, 2014; LWD Steiermark, 2015; Procter et al.,
2014) and affects decision making during back-country tours
(Techel et al., 2015; Furman et al., 2010) and in the work
of risk management authorities. Avalanche warnings provide
important information for back-country tour planning as well
as en route (Winkler and Techel, 2014; LWD Steiermark,
2015; Baker and McGee, 2016).
1.2 Warning and risk communication
The purpose of warnings is to inform people at risk about
the hazard and to promote “correct” and safe behaviour
(Wogalter et al., 1999). To do so, warnings may assess not
only threat and danger, but also exposure and vulnerabil-
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ity (WMO, 2015). Such impact-based warnings have been
shown to be more effective than other types of warnings
and are more and more in demand (DeJoy, 1999). Impact-
based warnings facilitate informed decision making, which
in turn leads to desirable outcomes and prevents unnecessary
costs to society (Pielke Jr. and Carbone, 2002). In the case
of avalanche warnings they provide users with both general
and specific information about the current and expected lev-
els of avalanche danger, the type of avalanche problem at
hand, and behavioural advice. The main aim of the warning
message is to inform the user about the nature and severity
of current and expected threats, and about how he or she can
mitigate the risk or avoid the threats. However, since most re-
gional AWS′ do not provide specific and local descriptions of
the forecasted risk, it may be difficult to effectively reach this
goal. In addition, most AWS′ lack detailed information on the
type of objects and number of individuals who are at risk, and
on the exposure and vulnerability of these. Thus, most AWS′
provide impact-based warnings in a general sense, but not in
terms of impact specific to detailed geographical locations,
people, roads, and so on. An AWS issues regional forecasts,
which describe the general probability and size of avalanches
in a geographical area. These forecasts may describe the gen-
eral impact for recreational activity, roads, buildings, etc., but
will not be able to determine the nature or scale of the impact
on individuals or objects. For example, if an AWS′ issues a
warning at level 5 extreme danger in a mountain area where
no one is recreating, the impact will be nil as nobody is ex-
posed to the danger. At the other end, this warning describes
the impact to people that are at risk, if people choose to travel
in avalanche terrain in extreme danger. So in a way the fore-
cast is impact-based, but it cannot quantify the impact specif-
ically as the AWS′ will not know how many people are ex-
posing themselves to the risk. The warnings advise the users
on how to reduce or avoid being exposed and vulnerable to
the avalanche danger, and thus the risk.
Although risk communication research has been a grow-
ing field since the 1980s (Sivle, 2016), some researchers re-
port that warning practices have not changed much during the
past decades (Kasperson, 2014), and there is sometimes a gap
between the intended message (warning) and the message
received (Gigerenzer et al., 2007). A range of factors con-
tributes to this gap. One such factor is that many people find
it difficult to interpret numbers and probabilities. People’s
ability to make meaning out of numbers and statistics is of-
ten referred to as numeracy (Lipkus and Peters, 2009). Both
large-scale surveys and small-scale experiments show that
many individuals lack this ability (Låg et al., 2014; Kirsch
et al., 2002) and that even well-educated individuals often
display a low level of numeracy (Lipkus et al., 2001). One
approach to mitigate this problem is to use qualitative expla-
nations with words like “likely” and “unlikely”. Even though
people vary in their understanding of such words, users can
conceptualize the concepts by comparing them to risks they
already understand (Gordon-Lubitz, 2003; Edwards and El-
wyn, 2001).
Another reason for a mismatch between the intended and
received messages is that people vary in their motivation to
use, and competence to read, warnings. The level of use and
understanding of the information provided in the warnings
vary between different user groups, and between different
geographical regions (Wogalter et al., 1997). Geographical
differences are driven both by differences in the character-
istics of the user groups present in the area and by differ-
ences in the complexity and amount of supporting informa-
tion provided by the regional AWS′s (Burkeljca, 2013a). Dif-
ferences in the use of warnings may further be driven by
variations in the level of trust in authorities and experts, and
by personal experiences of natural hazards (Wachinger et al.,
2013). Avalanche danger may in fact be so complex that a
novice will not be able to manage the same terrain as ex-
perts, no matter how well the warning is communicated. The
avalanche warnings are communicating a phenomenon that
many users conceive as a low-probability event, since many
users never or seldom experience a release of an avalanche
themselves. This conception may in itself reduce engage-
ment on the users’ side and interest in reading and using the
avalanche warning, and reduce interest in investing in under-
standing the warning. Another challenge is that the warnings
are used in several different ways, which also could lower the
interest.
Taken together, these differences make it difficult for
providers of avalanche warnings to meet the needs of all
groups. The challenge facing providers of avalanche fore-
casts is made even more difficult by the lack of research on
how efficient different ways of presenting the avalanche dan-
ger to different groups are. For example, less competent and
motivated users may need simplified explanations and direct
travel advice in order to be able to use the information. They
may easily be overloaded if the warning contains a lot of de-
tailed information (Maltz, 2000; Liang et al., 2006). For ad-
vanced users, on the other hand, simplified information and
advice may be of limited use. Instead this group may demand
detailed information about the snow cover. It can be challeng-
ing to simultaneously satisfy the needs of both groups.
1.3 The Norwegian Avalanche Warnings Service,
Varsom and RegObs
During the past few decades, Norway, as many other coun-
tries, has experienced a rapid increase in recreational win-
ter activities in avalanche terrain (mainly ski touring, snow-
mobiling and to some extent snowshoeing). The increase in
back-country recreation has unfortunately been associated
with an increase in fatal avalanche accidents. During the
decade 2008–2017, avalanches claimed 64 recreational fa-
talities (61 % occurred in northern Norway and Svalbard);
the corresponding number for the decade 1998–2007 was 31
(NGI, 2018). By contrast, avalanche fatalities in houses and
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during transportation decreased from 7 in 1998–2007 to 2
in 2008–2017 (NGI, 2018). Similar trends are reported from
other parts of the world (e.g. Techel et al., 2016). Another
three fatalities, all recreational, were recorded during the
2018 winter season. Thus Norway had eight fatalities the
last 3 years, which brings the annual fatality figures down
by 50 % as compared to the previous decade.
In other states with significant increase in the use of
avalanche terrain, such as in the US and several European
countries, Avalanche Warnings Services (AWS′) have suc-
ceeded in avoiding an increase in fatalities, although their
warning styles and formats have varied quite a bit. The trend
in the US has been a declining fatality rate: whereas the num-
ber of fatalities has been rather constant, the use of avalanche
terrain has surged (Birkeland, 2016).
In order to halt the undesirable trend in avalanche acci-
dents in Norway, the Norwegian Government in a white pa-
per in 2012 decided to establish the Norwegian Avalanche
Warnings Service (NAWS) in January 2013 (Engeset, 2013).
NAWS publishes regional avalanche warnings for Norway,
including Svalbard, on a daily basis on the web portal http:
//www.varsom.no (last access: 9 September 2018) (Johnsen,
2013). The Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Direc-
torate owns and operates NAWS in collaboration with the
Norwegian Public Roads Authorities and the Norwegian Me-
teorological Institute. The reduction in annual fatalities dur-
ing the previous 3–4 years suggests that NAWS is effective,
as the accident numbers have not increased although the use
of avalanche terrain for ski touring has increased drastically
in Norway, every year during the last decade or so.
In 2017, regional avalanche warnings were issued for
21 regions in Norway (Fig. 1). In addition, warnings were
issued for the rest of the country when the avalanche dan-
ger was expected to reach danger level 4 or 5. An example
of an avalanche warning on Varsom.no is shown in Fig. 2.
The avalanche warning published on Varsom.no includes the
elements described in Fig. 2 and Table 1.
Four elements (danger level and main message, region
map, avalanche problems, and mountain weather progno-
sis) are available in an English version of the warning
on Varsom.no, while two elements are in Norwegian only
(avalanche danger assessment and snow cover history) and
one is partly in English (RegObs-feed with observations).
All text but that of the main message and the avalanche
problems is written manually by the NAWS forecasters.
Sometimes forecasters use parts of the text from the previous
day, especially in the snow cover history. The text in the main
message is produced in the following manner: the forecasters
get a list of text suggestions that are available depending on
the chosen danger level and avalanche problem(s). He/she
may choose to use text from this list and edit it, write the
message from scratch or copy the text from the previous day.
The text in the travelling advice in the avalanche problem
is generated from a list of text suggestions. The selection of
text is based on the combination of the chosen danger level
and avalanche problem. The forecasters may edit the text af-
terwards. NAWS generates text suggestions in the forecast
editing software for the main message and avalanche prob-
lems in order make the text in the warnings easier for the
users to read, ensure that the terms and wordings are as good
and consistent as possible, make sure the time needed to pro-
duce the text is not too high and make translation of the text
to English as good and as easy as possible. NAWS has been
having discussions about the degree to which text is to be
created from scratch by individual forecasters or rather be
pre-defined or suggested from a standard library of sentences
and terms. NAWS uses a hybrid approach to this, and the
creative from-scratch text is mostly found in the main mes-
sage (Norwegian and English; the English version is some-
times an extended version of the Norwegian in order to in-
corporate more detailed information about the snow cover
and avalanche danger), avalanche danger assessment (Nor-
wegian only) and snowpack and avalanche history (Norwe-
gian only). However, creative text may suffer from poor lan-
guage and significant individual differences that are difficult
for the users to understand. Also, much time may be spent
writing text to convey a message that has already be written
in a much better way by someone else. However, the inter-
est and motivation of users may drop if they get the feeling
that too much text is auto-generated or copied and pasted.
NAWS is aware of this effect and continuously makes efforts
to prevent this from happening.
Since the start in 2013, NAWS has continuously worked
to improve both the competence level of observers and fore-
casters, and the system for presenting the forecast. User feed-
back suggested that most users find the warnings useful and
of high quality. However, to date, no formal evaluation has
been done of how effective NAWS is at communicating its
intended message. Such an evaluation is important, as pub-
lic avalanche warnings have only been available in Norway
since 2013 and Norwegian users are less used to using the
warnings to manage risk than users in countries with a longer
history of public avalanche warnings.
In order to improve the avalanche knowledge in the
Norwegian population in general, and the ski touring and
snowmobiling communities in particular, NVE launched the
“Snøskredskolen” (avalanche school) on Varsom.no. The
avalanche school is a tailor-made resource for users of the
avalanche warnings, as all key terms and concepts are ex-
plained and safe travelling advice is provided. It is also a
much used resource for avalanche course providers.
As a system in the Varsom.no portfolio, RegObs provides
data from the field as a basis for making forecasting deci-
sions. RegObs is an open web- and app-based system for re-
porting, storing, querying and sharing observations and as-
sessments from the field with the forecasters and the public.
The observations are public and a live feed of observations
is displayed on Varsom.no, next to the avalanche warning.
As such, RegObs is an integral part of Varsom.no and the
communication of the avalanche warnings. RegObs commu-
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Table 1. A description of the elements included in the avalanche warning on Varsom.no. Figure 2 shows how the elements are shown in
relation to each other on a smartphone web browser.
Element Description
1 Danger level and main message: the danger level is a combination of the probability
and size of expected avalanches in the region during the forecast period. The main message is a flash message
displayed next to the danger level, and is a short statement of what constitutes the hazard and what the advice
to the user is. This text is supposed to be very short and to the point, as if the user did not care to or have the
competence to read the rest of the warning. The English version of the main message may be longer than the
Norwegian, in order to include details about the snow cover that are otherwise accessible in Norwegian only.
2 Avalanche danger assessment: a more detailed description of the avalanche hazard and what is the reason
for it. It often includes a more detailed description of the uncertainty and local variability.
3 Region map: a map of the region, showing its extent and perimeter.
4 Avalanche problem(s) with management/travel advice: the avalanche problems, which at the time were
storm slab, dry loose, wind slab, wet slab, wet loose, persistent slab, and glide avalanches (Landrø et al.,
2013). A number of properties are forecasted for each avalanche problem: expected (destructive) size (1 to 5),
expected additional load (natural, low or high), distribution (isolated, few, some or many steep slopes), release
probability (possible, probable and likely) and core zone. Each avalanche problem has a pre-defined
management and travel advice according to danger level. A main characteristic of the avalanche problem in the
Norwegian warnings is that the properties of the weak layer are specified for slab-type avalanche problems, according
to the Systematic snow cover diagnosis system (Kronthaler et al., 2013). The different avalanche problems have
danger-specific advices for the users: How predictable and easy to detect is the problem in the field? Where in
the terrain is it easy to trigger or be caught by avalanches from this problem? How to reduce the vulnerability
to the problem? What should preparedness stakeholders be aware of?
5 Snow cover (and avalanche) history: this is a mixture of observation and an analysis of the snow cover at
the initial time of the forecast period. It is an important baseline for making a prognosis of how forecasted
weather may affect the avalanche danger during the forecasting period. It includes observations of recent
avalanche.
6 Mountain weather: this is the weather prognosis accessed at the time of writing the warning, and is thus the
basis for prescribing the avalanche danger in combination with the snow cover history.
7 RegObs observations: a real-time feed of observations submitted to and shared by the RegObs system.
Regobs is the national system for sharing field observations in real time (Ekker et al., 2013).
nicates the field observations and assessments that the warn-
ings are based on, in a transparent way. As far as we are
aware, RegObs is the only open-access online real-time dis-
tribution system for avalanche forecasting observations right
now, although previous efforts have provided open access
to accident data (Duclos et al., 2008). As far as the authors
are aware, there is no other completely open-access online
real-time distribution system. Other systems, such as the In-
foEx, the Mountain Information Network and the Mountain
Hub, lack open APIs or restrict access to functionality or data
partly or fully.
1.4 Aims of the study
The current study is part of a larger project, which focuses
on communication of flood, landslide, and avalanche danger
warnings. In this study, we evaluate the efficiency of warn-
ings by the NAWS on the website Varsom.no. Avalanche
warning systems are used in trip and preparedness planning,
and have been shown to have an influence on the decisions
people make in order to reduce risk (e.g. Furman et al., 2010;
Marengo et al., 2017). Mountain guides, course providers,
rescue services and avalanche observers report that people
actively respond to the avalanche warnings on Varsom.no,
and to a large degree choose snow, terrain and time/day for
travelling according to the danger level, avalanche problem
and advice provided by NAWS.
Warnings should therefore ideally be revealing and un-
ambiguous. To assess whether the warnings published by
NAWS fulfil these requirements, we asked the following re-
search questions: (1) which risk factors are considered most
difficult to assess and manage? (2) Which elements in the
warning are considered most and least important? (3) Which
elements are easily misunderstood or considered poorly com-
municated? (4) What kind of information and features are
missing or ignored by users?
We tested whether users interpreted the danger and be-
havioural implications differently depending on whether the
message was described by text, by symbols or by pictures.
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Figure 1. Screen dump from Varsom.no showing the avalanche warning regions in Norway. Daily warnings are published for the regions
coloured according to the danger level. The other regions (grey) are monitored and warnings are only published at danger levels 4 and 5.
Furthermore, we tested how well the warnings were under-
stood, by testing four alternative ways of communicating two
different danger scenarios. We developed a method, the com-
prehension effectiveness score, to test the comprehension.
2 Methods and data collection
We developed a web-based questionnaire and survey to col-
lect data for the study. Questionnaires are useful tools for
acquiring information on public knowledge and perception
Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 18, 2537–2559, 2018 www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci.net/18/2537/2018/
R. V. Engeset et al.: Communicating public avalanche warnings – what works? 2543
Figure 2. An example of an avalanche warning as issued on Varsom.no in 2017. The numbers refer to the elements analysed in this study.
(1) Danger level and main message, (2) avalanche danger assessment, (3) region map, (4) avalanche problems, (5) snow cover history,
(6) mountain weather prognosis and (7) RegObs-feed with observations. The figure shows the screen dump from a smartphone, with the
middle and right panels showing the screen as the user scrolls down the page. The warning has been translated from Norwegian to English.
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of natural hazards, and can provide valuable information to
emergency management agencies for developing risk man-
agement procedures (Bird, 2009). This chapter presents the
methods, participants and survey design of this study.
2.1 Participants
NAWS personnel participated in the expert survey (personal
invitation only), while all types of users participated in the
user survey (open invitation, anyone could participate). The
user survey participants included all types of users (var-
ious degrees of competence and experience, from begin-
ners/novices to experts; various types of use, from recre-
ational to professional and preparedness), while the NAWS
expert survey included only forecasters and observers, all
trained in the same system.
2.1.1 NAWS expert survey
The aim of the first survey was to derive a set of “correct”
answers to questions on the meaning of the presented warn-
ings. We therefore invited 200 avalanche experts (mainly
avalanche forecasters and observers in the NAWS) to par-
ticipate in the survey during the period 15–26 October 2017;
110 experts provided complete responses. Of these, 67 were
observers, 21 forecasters and 22 were not active in the fore-
casting. The last group consisted of former forecasters and
observers, and of individuals with a professional liaison role
in the forecasting services. Of those providing details about
gender, 25 % of the participants were women and 75 % were
men.
2.1.2 User survey
The purpose of the second survey was to test how well the
NAWS message was understood by non-expert users, and
therefore targeted users, and potential users, of the NAWS.
We recruited participants via social media, Varsom.no and
different user-related web pages.
A total of 485 respondents answered the user survey. Not
all respondents answered questions in all sections, leaving
264 respondents for analysis of Section B (avalanche warn-
ing), 222 respondents for analysis of Section C (text ver-
sus symbols and pictures) and 177 respondents for analysis
of Section D (comprehension). The lower number of user
respondents completing Sections C and D reflects a com-
mon challenge in web-based surveys to engage participants
enough to answer complex and time-consuming questions.
Of those proving details about gender, 17 % of the partici-
pants were women and 83 % were men. The mean age in the
sample was 35 years (min= 19, max= 69); 26 % of the re-
spondents lived in northern Norway, 8 % in Trøndelag, 11 %
at the north-western coast, 24 % at the western coast, 27 % in
the south-east, 1 % on Svalbard, and 2 % answered other.
2.2 Survey design
In order to obtain valid responses and avoid careless respond-
ing, it is important that participants are motivated to take the
survey, understand all questions, feel that they can answer
the questions, and do not lose interest before the end of the
survey (Meade and Craig, 2012). We therefore pretested and
revised all survey items in an iterative process. In the first
stage, NAWS personnel, both forecasters and observers, pro-
vided qualitative feedback on how well the avalanche warn-
ings communicated the message that NAWS would like to
disseminate, and this was taken into account when the ques-
tions and response alternatives were designed. We thereafter
asked a test panel consisting of project members (N = 12) to
provide iterative feedback on the content and structure of the
survey. Based on the feedback from the NAWS personnel and
the test panel, we rephrased several questions and instruc-
tions to improve clarity. We also reduced both the number
of questions and response alternatives. The latter shortened
the completion time of the survey to about 10 min. The sur-
vey was constructed so that it was possible to view and an-
swer all questions using a variety of devices, including smart-
phones. The general structure and purpose of each section of
the NAWS expert survey and user surveys are described be-
low.
The five sections (A–E) were identical in the NAWS expert
survey and the user survey. Sections B–D provided the core
data for the analysis in this paper. An overview of the survey
is provided in Table 2.
The two scenarios in Section D were based on accessing
the warnings (in Norwegian) on Varsom.no at the time of the
survey (autumn 2017). The four alternatives given for each
of the two scenarios in Section D were picked randomly for
each user respondent. We did not counterbalance the order:
all respondents received first the level 2 scenario and then
level 4, but with different alternatives for each scenario.
2.3 NAWS expert survey
As briefly mentioned above, the main purpose of the ex-
pert survey was to derive a template of “correct” answers.
More specifically, we wanted to identify key information el-
ements and define sets of behavioural implications in dif-
ferent avalanche danger scenarios. In other words, we used
the experts to operationalize the intended content of the
avalanche forecasts. To make sure that the operationaliza-
tion was valid, we used a relatively large and heterogeneous
group of avalanche experts.
To limit completion time and mental strain for partici-
pants, we only used two avalanche danger scenarios (level 2
and level 4; see section D in Table 2). Each expert was ran-
domly exposed to one out of four alternative ways to present
the forecast for each danger level (Fig. 3): (1) avalanche dan-
ger level with explanation, (2) avalanche problem with tech-
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nical details, (3) avalanche problem with technical details
only, and (4) avalanche problem with advice only.
After the expert respondent had read the example, we first
asked him or her to rate how well the danger was communi-
cated in the example, on a scale from 0 to 10. We thereafter
asked the expert to identify key information elements and be-
havioural implications of the avalanche forecast. The options
were pre-defined, as described in Table 3. We were specif-
ically interested in identifying the most important message
that the forecast aimed to communicate.
2.4 Communication effectiveness score
In order to establish a communication effectiveness score,
we used the NAWS expert answers to allocate weights to the
different behavioural implications. We allocated a positive
weight of +1 to elements positively identified as important
by more than one out of three experts (33 %), and a weight
of−1 to elements positively identified by less than one out of
five experts (20 %). All other elements were given a weight
of null.
Our reasoning behind using positive and negative weights
to calculate the communication effectiveness score is that
there is no objective correct answer. Accordingly, we use the
NAWS expert answers, where a factor receives+1 if the ma-
jority of experts provide support, 0 for inconclusive support
by the experts, and −1 if a small minority of experts regard
this factor as relevant. The rationale behind this approach was
to give a penalty (a weight of−1) to statements that were se-
lected by few/no NAWS experts and a point to statements
that were selected by many NAWS experts. In the design
phase, we explored using different algorithms for calculating
the scores, for example by using the relative number of ex-
perts selecting the statement as a weight or decimal weights.
However, in order to keep the method and results relatively
easy to understand and interpret, we choose a straightforward
approach.
The expert choices and resulting weights are listed in Ta-
ble 3. As can be seen in Table 3, many experts agreed on the
most important implications, and very few items are there-
fore close to the cut-off value. Nevertheless, to ensure that
our results do not hinge on our chosen levels (33 and 20 %),
we have tested both upward and downward variations of the
cut-off values. The results presented in Sect. 3 are robust to
these variations.
2.5 User survey
The user survey was open to the public during the pe-
riod 1 November–15 December 2017. We published links
to the survey on a relatively wide set of platforms: Var-
som.no, the free online skiing magazine friflyt.no, and on
the Facebook page of the most popular weather service
in Norway, YR.no. The association of snow scooter clubs
(Skuterklubbenes fellesråd) and the Norwegian Hiking Asso-
ciation (DNT) kindly distributed the survey to their members.
Finally, we announced the survey on the Nordic avalanche
conference in Åndalsnes in the beginning of November.
Each participant was asked to answer the full survey (Sec-
tions A–E). In Section D, the users were, just like the experts,
randomly exposed to one out of four alternative ways of pre-
senting the avalanche warning for the level 2 and level 4 sce-
narios, and thereafter to first rank how well the danger was
communicated on a scale from 1 to 10, and to mark the most
important behavioural implications of the warning.
We used the weights in Table 3 to calculate a “communi-
cation effectiveness score” for each participant and each be-
havioural implication. To illustrate, consider a user respon-
dent who ticked the boxes for statements 1–3 after reading
an example of the level 2 scenario. Based on the scores in
Table 3, we would give this user a score of −1 (the sum of
−1+ 1− 1). If the user instead ticked the boxes for state-
ments 3 and 5 after reading an example of the level 4 sce-
nario, we would give him or her a score of +2 (the sum of
+1+ 1). The scores for the level 2 scenario ranged from −4
to +4, and for the level 4 scenario from −6 to +3.
2.6 Web survey or field testing
Our overarching aim for this study was to investigate users’
comprehension of the warning. Ultimately, all public warn-
ings aim at making people take the correct actions at the cor-
rect time. However, there is a large body of evidence demon-
strating that there is a mismatch between what people say and
what they do (e.g. Jerolmack and Khan, 2014). Therefore,
if we studied people’s behaviour and not comprehension we
would not know whether the lack of correct action was due
to lack of comprehension or rather a mismatch between atti-
tudes and behaviour.
Self-reports are by many accounts not a perfect method,
but in this case we found them to be the best approach to test
people’s comprehension. In addition they allow us to col-
lect a substantially larger number of respondents compared
to for example a field study or interviews. A web-based sur-
vey is also relevant, as many decisions are made based on
reading the avalanche warning on the web ahead of getting
into navigation in the terrain. It could be decisions such as to
choose forest rather than alpine for today’s trip, or to delay
the planned trip a few days until the snow stabilizes. How-
ever, it would be very interesting to test what people know
and also what they do. This would call for a different study
altogether, but is a very good idea for future research.
2.7 Ethics
This study registered anonymous information exclusively
and did not collect data that can be used to identify individu-
als. All respondents actively gave their consent for the use of
the data for research and the project.
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Figure 3. Alternatives 1 to 4 used for the two scenarios: (a) level 2 and wind slab (upper panel) and (b) level 4 and wet slabs (lower panel).
The text has been translated from Norwegian into English.
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Table 2. Overview of the survey.
Section Purpose
A Collect background information related to avalanche training and competence, e.g. association with NAWS, if
any, level of avalanche competence and training, activity level in terms of travelling in avalanche terrain, and
level of comprehension of avalanche terrain.
B Understand how respondents evaluate the available elements in the warning and how these are communicated
(which elements are most important, least important, difficult to assess and manage, poorly communicated or
easily misunderstood, and which elements are missing).
C Test how users perceive three different ways of presenting the avalanche danger: text, symbols, and pictures.
D Test the comprehension of two scenarios:
– danger level 2 (wind slab problem), based on the warning for Troms region on 18 April 2017, and
– danger level 4 (wet slab problem), based on the warning for Troms region on 4 April 2017.
For each scenario, the participant was first randomly presented with one out of four alternative ways of
communicating the danger:
1. Avalanche danger level with explanation (general advice associated with the danger level),
2. Avalanche problem with technical details (avalanche rose, probability, distribution, expected size and
type of avalanches) and advice (advice on how to manage the problem including travel advice),
3. Avalanche problem with technical details only, and
4. Avalanche problem with advice only.
We thereafter asked the respondent to interpret and evaluate the warning in terms of (1) behavioural
implications (based on a pre-defined set of options), (2) how well the avalanche warning was presented, and
(3) how the respondent would describe the warning to others, and what travel advice s/he would give to them.
E Collect background information related to demographics, and back-country recreation, e.g. gender, age, home
region, terrain activities, and use of avalanche gear and forecast.
Table 3. Expert survey results (number of respondents selecting the statement, in %) and design weights established for a communication
effectiveness score.
Statement 2 scenario 2 scenario 4 scenario 4 scenario
response weight response weight
1. Unngå alle løsneområder (avoid all release areas) 20 % −1 84 % +1
2. Unngå noen løsneområder (avoid some release areas) 63 % +1 9 % −1
3. Unngå alle utløpsområder (avoid all runout areas) 8 % −1 84 % +1
4. Unngå noen utløpsområder (avoid some runout areas) 39 % +1 11 % −1
5. Unngå skredutsatte veier (avoid avalanche-exposed roads) 6 % −1 75 % +1
6. Kunne mye om snø for å vite hva jeg skal unngå (know a lot about 29 % 0 16 % −1
snow in order to know what to avoid)
7. Grave i snøen for å vite hva jeg skal unngå (dig in the snow in 12 % −1 6 % −1
order to know what to avoid)
8. Vite mye om været siste to dager for å velge terreng (know a lot 45 % +1 13 % −1
about the weather the last two days in order to choose terrain)
9. Forvente store lokale forskjeller (expect large local variability) 71 % +1 16 % −1
3 Results
In this chapter, we present the avalanche-related demo-
graphics of the user respondents (sections A and E), well-
functioning and malfunctioning parts of the 2017 version of
the avalanche warnings on Varsom.no, as perceived by the
participants (Section B), the participants’ evaluation of how
well text, symbols and pictures assist the informational con-
tent in the warnings (data from Section C), the participants’
evaluations of how well different levels of complexity in the
text persuade the informational content in the warnings (data
from Section D), and test results for level of comprehension
at different levels of complexity in the warning texts (also
data from Section D).
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Table 4. Contingency table of user respondents’ experience (num-
ber of tours in avalanche terrain per year) versus competence.
Competence Experience (tours in avalanche
terrain per year)
0 < 5 5–15 > 15 N
None 10 % 48 % 35 % 8 % 40
Competent, no course 6 % 23 % 41 % 30 % 81
Competent, course 0 % 6 % 39 % 55 % 121
Expert 0 % 5 % 14 % 82 % 22
3.1 Demographics
The statistics of the users with respect to competence, expe-
rience, activities and geography are listed below and in Ta-
ble 4.
– 14 % of the user respondents had no or little avalanche
knowledge (labelled “None” in Table 4), 27 % stated
that they had avalanche-related competence but no for-
mal training (“Competent, no course”), 48 % stated
that they had avalanche-related competence and for-
mal training (“Competent, course”), and 10 % were
avalanche instructors or professionals (“Expert”).
– 82 % stated that they had used avalanche gear (e.g.
avalanche beacon, shovel and probe) for several sea-
sons, 7 % for one season only, and 11 % had never used
this type of equipment.
– The majority of users stated that their main activity in
avalanche terrain was alpine ski touring (66 %). Rela-
tively many users also stated that they engaged in off-
piste skiing (32 %), or Nordic mountain skiing (23 %),
while relatively few said that they travel in avalanche
terrain by foot (9 %), on a snowmobile (7 %), or on snow
shoes (3 %). Three percent stated that they engage in
other types of activities in avalanche terrain. Note that
the users could chose multiple activities.
– Concerning the use of NAWS, 76 % of the users an-
swered that they always use the avalanche warnings,
21 % that they use the warnings on a regular basis, and
3 % that they rarely read the forecast.
Many of the respondents have avalanche-related competence
and formal training, and many use the avalanche warnings on
a regular basis. This suggests that the sample of respondents
could be biased towards a population with more avalanche
expertise than average.
3.2 Avalanche warning
A total of 264 user respondents completed the questions in
Section B. In this section, we asked the respondents to iden-
tify risk factors that they perceived difficult to manage or
Figure 4. Factors users and NAWS experts considered difficult to
assess and manage in order to have a safe trip in avalanche terrain.
mitigate, parts of the avalanche warnings that they perceived
difficult to understand, and important information perceived
to be missing in the avalanche warnings. Key results from
the 110 respondents in the NAWS expert survey are also pre-
sented in this chapter for comparison.
3.2.1 Avalanche risk factors considered difficult to
assess and manage
In order to find out what the users consider to be most diffi-
cult to assess and manage, we asked “Which factors are most
difficult to assess and manage in order to complete a safe
trip?” The respondents could choose multiple factors. Avail-
able factors and results are shown in Fig. 4. The results show
the following.
– The vast majority (87 %) of the users perceive the snow
cover to be the single most difficult factor to assess and
manage. This judgement does not depend on the respon-
dent’s experience or competence (χ2 test, p = 0.516
and p = 0.403, respectively); 86 % of the NAWS ex-
perts considered this factor to be the most difficult fac-
tor.
– 34 % of the users perceive other people in the group to
be the most problematic factor. More than every second
NAWS expert (51 %) rated this as the most difficult one.
– Among the users, there is a relatively even distribution
of individuals who perceive terrain traps (28 %) and
weather (25 %) to constitute the other most problematic
factors.
– Steepness is perceived as a problematic factor among
relatively few respondents.
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Figure 5. Factors the users and the NAWS experts considered most
important in the avalanche warning on Varsom.no.
3.2.2 Avalanche risk factors considered most and least
important
In order to find out what the users consider to be the most im-
portant element in the warning, we asked “Which elements
in the avalanche warning are most important?” The respon-
dents could choose multiple answers. Alternatives and results
are presented in Fig. 5. The results show that the users per-
ceive a relatively wide range of elements in the warning to be
important.
– A majority of the users state that the avalanche assess-
ment (69 %), the avalanche problems (67 %) and the
main message (65 %) constitute the three most impor-
tant elements in the warning.
– About half of the users consider the snow cover history
(56 %) and the danger level (48 %) to be important.
– Over a third of the users consider snow and avalanche
observations (37 %), mountain weather (39 %) and
management advice (42 %) to be important.
We find no evidence that the elements chosen as most im-
portant depended on age, gender or experience (linear re-
gression R2 = 0.022, p = 0.224). The NAWS experts rated
the avalanche problems as the most important factor (77 %),
followed by the avalanche assessment (62 %), the main mes-
sage (57 %) and the snow cover history (55 %). The danger
level was considered most important by 39 % only.
In order to find out what the users consider of least im-
portance or use, we asked “Was anything of little use or im-
portance? You may elaborate on the problem being format,
content or other”. A total of 69 participants responded to this
question. Twenty of these provided positive or neutral com-
ments. We summarize the critical feedback, and our interpre-
tation of this feedback, below.
– Seven users stated that they found the mountain weather
to be superfluous, and that they rather used the standard
weather forecast. Thus, clarification in the difference
between the weather forecast and the summary of the
mountain weather, and the link between the mountain
weather history and forecast, and the avalanche forecast,
is recommended.
– Five users stated that the warning contained too many,
and complex details and information. These users were
mainly novices. This may imply that users with less
skills and interest in the topic fail to get the key mes-
sages.
– However, another set of six users considered the level
of detail to be too low. These users stated that the use-
fulness of the warning would be higher if it were less
general, and if the forecast region was smaller. These
answers point to the possibility that general forecasts
for relatively large regions reduce the attention paid to
the warnings.
– Three users found the core zone sector diagram to be
problematic. More specifically, these users found it dif-
ficult to know whether dark sectors represent safe or
unsafe regions. Although only three users commented
on this, their feedback is important since it implies
that some users of NAWS may chose the unsafe sec-
tor because they misunderstand the graphics. See also
Sect. 3.2.3 for related results.
– Finally, four users found the snow and avalanche obser-
vations sometimes to be too complicated or described in
too difficult terms.
3.2.3 Elements easily misunderstood or poorly
communicated
A total of 95 users provided comments on whether the
avalanche warning contains parts that are easily misunder-
stood or poorly communicated. Thirty of the comments were
positive or neutral. We summarize the critical feedback, and
our interpretation of the comments, below.
– Eleven users found the core zone sector diagram to be
easily misunderstood. Like in the case of users who
stated that the core sector diagram to be of little use,
these users stated that they found it difficult to know
which of the sectors (dark or light) that are most danger-
ous. Some users suggested to add a legend or use more
or different colours. These findings corroborate the find-
ings in Sect. 3.2.2.
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Figure 6. Test of what communicates the avalanche problem best in the avalanche warning: (a) text, (b) symbols or (c) pictures.
– Another 11 users perceived the regional warnings to
provide too little detail in terms of spatial or tempo-
ral variability, and that the forecasted regions were
too large. These findings corroborate the findings in
Sect. 3.2.2.
– Eight users found it difficult to understand the danger
level, in terms of the meaning and consequence of it
for the user. This is important, because if users do not
understand the meaning of the danger level, they are
poorly equipped to manage their risk exposure.
– Finally, six users stated that the large amount of infor-
mation provided in the warning made it difficult, espe-
cially for beginners, to decipher the key message. This
corroborates the findings reported in Sect. 3.2.2, where
five users stated that the warning contained too much
detail and information.
The answers from the NAWS expert survey suggest that ex-
perts perceive similar factors to be as problematic as users
do: i.e. the core sector and elevation diagrams, spatial and
temporal variability, danger level, and uncertainty. However,
the NAWS experts also pointed to a few problematic factors
not mentioned by the users: avalanche size (especially the
name “small” used for size 2), probability and distribution.
Note that the EAWS is changing the denominations used for
avalanche sizes during 2018, which will resolve the problem
with communicating size 2 avalanches.
3.2.4 Missing information and features
In the final part of Section B, we asked the respondents
to identify missing information in the avalanche warning.
Sixty-seven respondents provided comments. About 20 of
these stated that no important information was missing. The
elements asked for by the remaining 47 participants were the
following:
– observed weather and snow, and links to more detailed
observations;
– ATES recommendations (Avalanche Terrain Exposure
Scale is a method for classifying the degree of terrain
avalanche-exposure, Statham et al., 2006);
– advice connected to competence levels, and
– more detailed warnings/information. Better visualiza-
tion of important weak layers (depth, type, etc.).
We also asked the participants whether some information
or features are missing in the RegObs application. Eighty-
one users responded to this question, of which about 35 re-
sponded that they did not use the application or were indif-
ferent. The users asked for the following to be included in
future releases:
– weather data,
– a possibility to enter and record snow profiles,
– a possibility to read the avalanche warning (at least the
danger level and avalanche problems) in the application,
– an opportunity to track trips,
– a more user-friendly interface,
– access to avalanches and avalanche paths,
– information about actual elevation in relation to the
avalanche problem elevation range, and
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Table 5. Results from the test of what communicates the avalanche
problem best in the avalanche warning.
Text Symbol Picture Rating
46 % 51 % 38 % Good
40 % 38 % 36 % OK
14 % 11 % 25 % Poor
– easy access to the snow cover history and relevant recent
snow profiles nearby.
Several of these features are being implemented by the time
of publication of this study.
The results from the NAWS expert survey suggested that
these pieces of information in demand:
– more precise description of where in the region or ter-
rain the avalanche problem is expected, and where the
danger level is expected to be lower, and
– a better description of the uncertainty and local variabil-
ity.
3.3 Testing of text versus symbols or pictures
In section C, we asked the respondents to rate how well text,
icons, and pictures communicate the avalanche problem on
a scale from 1= poor, to 3= good. Each respondent evalu-
ated two types of avalanche problems: a wind slab, and a
persistent slab (see Fig. 6). A total of 222 user respondents
completed this section of the survey.
The results show that users preferred text and symbols
to pictures (Table 5): 89 % rated the new EAWS symbols
as good or OK. The users were familiar with the names
of the avalanche problems, which have been presented as
text on Varsom.no during the previous three seasons. The
users were not familiar with the symbols, as they were in-
troduced at Varsom.no for the 2017/2018 season after be-
ing introduced as an EAWS standard in June 2017 (EAWS,
2017b). Pictures have not been used in the warning on Var-
som.no, but a few users may have seen the pictures in the
avalanche school at Varsom.no. Notably, we found that the
symbols were rated more positively the more experienced
a respondent was: χ2203 = 15.26, p = 0.018. The text and
pictures were rated equally irrespective of one’s experience:
p = 0.338 and p = 0.543, respectively.
3.4 Testing of comprehension of the two scenarios
A total of 177 user respondents completed the test for com-
prehension in Section D by responding to one of the four
alternatives for each of the two scenarios. To recap, we
asked the respondents to (1) rate how well they perceived
the avalanche danger to be communicated, (2) what the most
important behavioural implications of the warning were, and
(3) what advice they would give to others based on the warn-
ing message. We measured how well the danger was com-
municated in the warning on a scale from 1 to 10. Of those
who provided answers to this question, 21 % gave a rating
of 10, and 56 % a rating of 8 or higher. Only 14 % gave a rat-
ing of 4 or lower. Mean ratings for the two scenarios (danger
level 2 and level 4) and for each of the four alternatives are
presented in Fig. 7 below (left column). Figure 7 also depicts
the comprehension scores (right column). Higher scores in-
dicate a higher match between the behavioural implications
chosen by the users and the NAWS experts. For the danger
level 2 scenario the minimum score is −4 and the maximum
score is+4, while scores for the danger level 4 scenario range
from −6 to +3.
We next compared the user ranking and comprehension
score in more detail, by (a) comparing the comprehension
score to a score of 0 and (b) investigating whether user rank-
ing or comprehension differs between the four alternatives
with ANCOVAs where a user’s experience was a covariate.
For statistical analysis we used JASP (2018).
3.4.1 Danger level 2 wind slab scenario
For the danger level 2 wind slab scenario, the average user
ranking of the four alternatives ranged from 5.1 to 7.4. The
four alternatives were rated differently: F(3, 172)= 10.124,
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.149. Alternative 2, i.e. an avalanche prob-
lem with technical information and advice, was rated high-
est, and alternative 1, a danger level with an explanation,
least informative. A post hoc Tukey test confirmed it: al-
ternative 1 was rated lower than the other three alternatives
(p′s =< 0.001, smallest effect size Cohen’s d = 0.814). A
user’s competence had no effect on the ranking of the alter-
natives: F(1, 172)= 1.966, p = 0.163, η2 = 0.010. Experi-
ence was also non-significant; a user’s experience had no ef-
fect on the ranking of the alternatives: F(1, 172)= 0.469,
p = 0.494, η2 = 0.002.
Comprehension was good, with all four alternatives yield-
ing overall positive scores, i.e. one-sampled tests for all four
alternatives were significantly different from a score of 0 (al-
ternative 1: p = 0.015, alternatives 2–4: p′s < 0.001). Still,
the comprehension scores were different for the four al-
ternatives: F(3, 172)= 8.188, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.120. Al-
ternative 1, a danger level with an explanation, had the
lowest comprehension score and was significantly differ-
ent from the other three alternatives; post hoc Tukey tests
had the smallest p = 0.021 and the smallest effect size Co-
hen’s d = 0.541. Notably, the higher the competence the bet-
ter the comprehension was: F(1, 172)= 7.777, p = 0.006,
η2 = 0.038. Finally, there was a positive correlation be-
tween user ranking and comprehension: ρ = 0.2, p = 0.008,
95 % CI [.054; .337].
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Figure 7. (a) User rating (left) and comprehension score (right) for the level 2 wind slab scenario; (b) user rating and comprehension score
for the level 2 wet slab scenario.
3.4.2 Danger level 4 wet slab scenario
For the danger level 4 wet slab scenario, the average user
ranking of the four alternatives ranged from 6.7 to 7.7. All
alternatives (danger level, avalanche problem) were ranked
high, and there was no statistically significant difference:
F(3, 172)= 1.787, p = 0.151, η2 = 0.030. Also, a user’s
experience and competence did not influence the ranking
(both F ′s < 1).
Comprehension was good, with all four presentations of
the scenario yielding overall positive scores. All but alter-
native 3 had a significant positive score (alternative 3 only
marginally: p = 0.065, Cohen’s d = 0.262). The four al-
ternatives did differ: F(3, 173)= 4.188, p = 0.007, η2 =
0.067. Alternative 3, an avalanche problem with technical in-
formation only, received a significantly lower comprehension
score than alternative 1 (post hoc Tukey: p = 0.037, Cohen’s
d = 0.607), and alternative 4 (post hoc Tukey p = 0.006,
Cohen’s d = 0.763). A user’s competence had no effect on
comprehension: F(1, 172)= 0.93, p = 0.336, η2 = 0.005.
There was also no relationship between user ranking and
comprehension: ρ =−0.095, p = 0.207.
3.4.3 Comparison
The results show that for the danger level 2 scenario, the
three alternatives with the avalanche problems communicate
more effectively than the one with the danger level. The user
ranking and the calculated comprehension score provide con-
sistent results. For the danger level 4 scenario, on the other
hand, the alternatives with the danger level and avalanche
problem with travel advice score higher than the two other
alternatives. The difference is clearer for the calculated com-
prehension score than for the user ranking. The alternative
with the avalanche problem and technical details seems to
communicate least effectively however, it is also possible that
users become too careful/conservative and rate factors as im-
portant that experts do not, and hence receive a lower score.
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4 Discussion
The purpose of this paper was to evaluate how well the
avalanche warnings, as provided by NAWS, are communi-
cated to the public, and whether some modes of presenting
the warnings are more effective than others in communicat-
ing the intended message. We discuss our main findings be-
low: firstly, we discuss the user results that are reported in
Sect. 3.2 (avalanche warning); secondly we discuss the re-
sults reported in Sect. 3.3 (modes of communication: text
versus symbols and pictures) and finally the results from the
test of comprehension reported in Sect. 3.4.
4.1 The avalanche warning
Our survey responses suggest that users find it most difficult
to assess and manage the snow cover, but that relatively many
individuals also find it challenging to manage group dynam-
ics and terrain traps. The fact that so many (both experts,
experienced users and novices) struggle with an evaluation
of the snow cover and its impact on the avalanche hazard
is not surprising. The snow cover is difficult to assess and
manage, it can vary considerably over both short time peri-
ods and distances (Schweizer et al., 2008). It is created by
a complex and dynamic interaction between the atmosphere,
the old snow cover, and the ground, and the development of
the snow cover over time may create complex structures and
properties. Visual surface clues are few and information on
the internal structure and properties hard to come by. The dif-
ficulty in assessing and managing the snow cover is reflected
in what users perceive as most important in the avalanche
warning: the avalanche assessment, the avalanche problems
and the main message.
A well-functioning avalanche warning needs to translate
the complex dynamics and characteristics of the snow cover
and avalanche hazard into a clear message that novices and
experts find useful and can translate into behavioural impli-
cations. However, although the responses to our survey ques-
tions suggest that most users demand this type of informa-
tion, the responses also show that it is challenging to create a
warning that will fit all needs. While some users would like
to see more detailed information on the type of avalanche
problems and geographical distribution of these problems,
the characteristics of the snow cover (including spatial and
temporal variability), weather patterns, and estimates of un-
certainty in the forecast, other users state that the amount of
information and detail currently available in the warning is
already too high and complex, and that it makes them con-
fused.
Today, the Norwegian avalanche warning describes the
avalanche hazard using both symbolic representations, a
summary of the behavioural implications, and more lengthy
descriptions of the avalanche problem, the snow cover, and
the mountain weather. In addition, users have access to snow
observations via RegObs. The symbolic representation of the
avalanche danger and main message is currently presented at
the top of the page, while more detailed information is avail-
able lower down or to the side.
Our interpretation of the responses given in the survey is
that the avalanche warning should maintain its current struc-
ture, with easy-to-grasp information for all users (novices as
well as experts) at the top level of the warning, and more de-
tailed and complete information for advanced users, e.g. in-
formation about the type of avalanche problem, character,
timing, geographical distribution, and reliability of observa-
tions, at a lower level. On the other hand, most NAWS ex-
perts (77 %) and users (67 %) rated the avalanche problem as
the most important element of the warning. This, in combina-
tion with several users saying that there is too much and too
complex a text (i.e. redundancy), suggests that the avalanche
problems should be communicated high up in the warning.
A more compact presentation with less information would
strengthen the communication efficiency, in particular if the
overlap with the avalanche danger assessment text is reduced.
We also see several other areas for improvement. (1) The
danger level was considered important by many, but by less
than 50 % of the users. This may suggest that this element
may be better off at a less pronounced place on the page.
(2) Many individuals find it difficult to interpret the core sec-
tor and elevation diagrams, mainly in terms of identifying
safe and unsafe sectors. To remedy this problem, it may prove
beneficial to show the danger level and/or avalanche problem
in two to three different elevation bands, as is done by sev-
eral European and Canadian AWS′, or to use bold red colours
(at the risk of confusing it with the red colour used for dan-
ger level 4) and clearer fonts. (3) Information on weather is
at times repeated in several places in the avalanche warn-
ing, e.g. in the weather forecast, the avalanche assessment,
the avalanche problems and the snow cover discussion. To
improve clarity and readability, it may prove beneficial to re-
move redundant information about the weather. (4) To in-
crease the usefulness of snow observations, the interface of
RegObs may need revision.
4.2 Modes of communication: text versus symbols and
pictures
Our empirical analysis shows that most respondents prefer
symbols and text to pictures. The preference for text mes-
sages may partly be explained by the fact that users have be-
come accustomed to this mode of communication: NAWS
has presented the avalanche warnings using text during its
5 years of operation. Another potential explanation is that
the names of the avalanche problems are easily communi-
cated verbally – in interviews in the media, during avalanche
courses and when discussing the avalanche danger before
and during trips. Even though symbols are efficient, text la-
bels are very useful. The EAWS symbols were new to Nor-
wegian users, and the positive rating of these supports the
decision to introduce these symbols as a standard in Europe.
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Unfortunately, it was beyond the scope of this study to test
whether the wording of text messages and the symbolic rep-
resentation of avalanche problems are optimal for commu-
nicating the intended message. To do this, more advanced
testing is needed.
The relatively low rating of pictures may be explained by
the choice of certain pictures, or by the amount of detail
in them. Pictures are bound to be taken at a certain loca-
tion, under certain circumstances, and almost always contain
some amount of irrelevant information. As a consequence,
the main message may become blurred, and some users may
feel that the snow or landscape is not representative of the
avalanche forecast or region. More tests of pictures, or even
video, could be carried out to explore whether these oth-
erwise very effective media could be used to communicate
the avalanche danger, perhaps as a complement to the other
parts of the forecast. NAWS has posted pictures and videos
of the current situation a number of times on Facebook, and
especially the videos have had a large impact measured by
the number of views, likes, comments and shares. This sug-
gests that a more elaborate study on the effect of pictures and
videos should be carried out. However, the costs of obtaining
relevant quality video and pictures may outweigh the bene-
fits.
4.3 Modes of communication: comprehension
We evaluated comprehension of the communicated
avalanche warnings by the use of two methods: we
first asked respondents to rate how well the avalanche hazard
and the associated behavioural implications were com-
municated, and thereafter tested whether different modes
of communication resulted in different “comprehension
scores”. All participants evaluated a danger level 2 scenario
(wind slab) and a danger 4 scenario (wet slab). In each of
these scenarios, the participants were randomly exposed
to one out of four alternative descriptions of the avalanche
hazard and asked to choose the behavioural implications
associated with the warning. The comprehension score was
based on a comparison between the choices made by users
and a template constructed from the answers made by a
panel of NAWS experts.
Our empirical analysis of the subjective rating of the
avalanche warnings shows that most users perceive Var-
som.no to communicate the avalanche hazard in a good way:
51 % of the users rated the communication of the danger in
the level 4 scenarios as 8 or higher, on a scale from 1 to 10
(41 % in the level 2 scenario). These results are consistent
with previous studies on user satisfaction (Kosberg et al.,
2013; Barfod et al., 2014, 2015) and the conclusions in a
recent evaluation of NAWS (Hisdal et al., 2017).
The rating of the different alternatives dependents on the
scenario. For the level 2 (wind slab) scenario, alternative 2
(avalanche problem and technical information and advice)
received the highest rating, slightly higher than alternative 4
(avalanche problem and advice). Alternative 1 (danger level)
was rated the lowest. For the level 4 (wet slab) scenario,
it was alternative 1 that received the highest rating but this
was not significantly different from any of the other alterna-
tives. These results suggest that the users perceive that they
need more detailed information than just a danger level when
given a danger level 2, but are highly satisfied with knowing
the danger level if it is 4. Notably, for danger level 2 a user’s
competence mattered when it came to the rating of the al-
ternatives, but not for danger level 4. This suggests that the
value of more detailed information about the avalanche prob-
lem increase as the user’s competence level increase. Level 4
might be a cut-off for most, in terms of making the deci-
sion not to enter avalanche terrain. The avalanche-related
demographics data from the user respondents (Section A
and E) showed that the more competent the users, the more
tours they undertake in avalanche terrain. However, quite a
few of those without competence or courses are also active
ski touring. Most respondents assessed themselves as being
competent. Hallandvik et al. (2017) showed that novices as-
sessed the terrain for a specific site as less complex than
experts, they weighted information in the avalanche fore-
cast differently, and used different strategies to gather in-
formation about the snowpack on a trip. Thus experience
and competence matter to a certain degree when commu-
nicating avalanche danger. In our study, the sample of re-
spondents may be biased towards experienced and interested
users, which may somehow affect the results (e.g. Haegeli et
al., 2012).
Our results from the test of the level of comprehension for
the level 2 scenario (wind slab) are largely consistent with
participants’ subjective evaluations: participants score signif-
icantly lower on the comprehension score if the only infor-
mation available is a danger level with a standard explanation
(alternative 1). We therefore argue that a simple danger level
is not enough to convey the intended warning message on
lower danger levels. At this level, the users consider how to
travel in avalanche terrain, rather than whether or not to enter
avalanche terrain. Rather, in this situation the warning should
present the avalanche problem with a reasonable level of de-
tail. Our results do not provide a clear answer to the question
of which details are most important in order to communicate
the message; indeed, all three alternatives yielded a higher
comprehension score than alternative 1.
The results from the level 4 scenario (wet slab) are
markedly different from the level 2 scenario, in terms of
both comprehension scores and the match between objective
comprehension and subjective evaluations. In contrast to the
level 2 scenario, users rated all alternatives equally. How-
ever, in this scenario, the comprehension score was signifi-
cantly lower for alternative 3 than it was for alternatives 1
and 4. In other words, leaving out the advice and explana-
tion resulted in a lower comprehension. Note though that all
four alternatives yielded positive scores: most users did se-
lect the same factors as the experts. One possible explanation
Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 18, 2537–2559, 2018 www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci.net/18/2537/2018/
R. V. Engeset et al.: Communicating public avalanche warnings – what works? 2555
for the observed lower comprehension score for alternative 3
is that the technical information caused confusion rather than
helped the respondents.
Based on the results of our empirical analysis, our rec-
ommendation is that NAWS should carefully assess the im-
portance and priority of details presented with the avalanche
problem in order to shorten and simplify the communication
of the danger to the different user groups. It is important
to consider the redundancy of information. If two or three
avalanche problems are presented in the warning, the redun-
dancy between the details in the problems as well as the main
message and danger assessment may be considerable. NAWS
should consider how to normalize the avalanche warning, in
order to avoid repeating the same information several times.
Our results also points to the importance of communicating
the avalanche problems at a high level in the warning, es-
pecially for warnings on lower danger levels. However, both
the avalanche situation and the snow cover may be very com-
plex across the warning region and forecasting period. The
NAWS warning regions are about 20 times the European av-
erage (Engeset, 2013; Techel et al., 2018), and some have
rather complex topography and weather patterns. Simplicity
may not always be achievable without leaving out important
information for the users.
There are several factors that may have affected the results
presented in this study, and we would like to linger around
them. First, it is important to note that this study targeted
recreational users, and not preparedness authority person-
nel. The needs of novice, advanced, and professional users
are likely to differ. While simple symbols and messages are
likely beneficial for individuals with less avalanche knowl-
edge, technical details can be of great use for advanced users.
Properties such as sector, elevation, size and probability of
release are useful when considering which roads or residen-
tial areas are exposed to the avalanche danger. We therefore
recommend that a more detailed study should be carried out,
in order to investigate what is effective to communicate to
preparedness users. Second, the Norwegian users were only
recently introduced to a national avalanche warning system.
This implies that many users have been in the process of
acquiring knowledge about how to assess avalanche dan-
ger during the period from 2013 to 2018. Other than the
avalanche warnings provided by NAWS, few sources for as-
sessing the avalanche danger are available in Norway. Most
avalanche courses frequently use the avalanche warnings and
avalanche educational resources on Varsom.no. Finally, we
only tested a limited set of alternative communication modes
to the participants. To fully evaluate how to optimally design
the avalanche warning, tests with more variations and scenar-
ios are needed.
5 Conclusions and recommendations
In this study, we investigated how well users perceive the
avalanche warnings on Varsom.no (http://www.varsom.no,
last access: 9 September 2018) to be communicated, and
whether different modes of communication affect the level of
comprehension of the hazard at hand. We also identified ele-
ments in the avalanche warnings that users perceive to be of
greater or lesser importance, easily misunderstood, or miss-
ing.
Based on our empirical analysis of the data, we make the
following conclusions and recommendations.
1. Redesign core zone and elevation graphics/text. Prob-
lem: participants found it difficult to understand
whether the avalanche problems were present or ab-
sent in coloured sectors. Possible solution: use colours,
bolder text and better symbols, and show the danger
level and/or avalanche problem in two to three different
elevation bands, as is done by several European AWS′
and in Canada.
2. Less is more. Problem: the amount of text and detail in
the warning reduced the motivation to read the warn-
ing and made it more difficult for the user to pick up
the main message. Possible solution: minimize repeti-
tive information and reduce complexity.
3. Local information matters. Problem: the avalanche
warnings are produced for relatively large geographical
areas with big spatial variations in the snow cover. Pos-
sible solution: use maps to show the parts of the region
(subregions or elevation intervals) that are most affected
by the avalanche problem(s), or where the avalanche
danger is expected to be one value higher or lower than
the rest of the region. Maps could show which parts
are most affected, by showing the properties creating
the avalanche problems, e.g. heavy precipitation, wind,
or temperature. NAWS could use sub-regions as a way
to provide better information in the textual analysis.
NAWS will probably not have information with the re-
quired detail to present higher-resolution maps of dan-
ger level or avalanche problems yet. Another way could
be to present local weather history, and/or snow obser-
vations from automatic stations, or to present the snow
history by visualizing some manual snow observations
as time series.
4. We need to teach snow dynamics. Problem: a very large
share of respondents state that they find it most difficult
to assess and manage the snow cover. Possible solution:
present the avalanche problem, snow cover analysis and
avalanche danger assessment in a more systematic and
pedagogical manner in order to improve the competence
of the users. It should be noted that even the NAWS ex-
perts considered the snow cover to be the most difficult
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factor, suggesting that it is complex to manage for users
at all levels.
5. We need to teach people dynamics and terrain traps.
Problem: a large share find it difficult to manage others
in the group. Many also find terrain traps problematic.
Possible solution: use the “avalanche school” to educate
users about terrain traps and talk about group dynam-
ics to help users make better choices about whom they
choose to recreate with in avalanche terrain.
6. Avalanche problem is important. Problem: the
avalanche danger level is not enough for making deci-
sions in avalanche terrain, more detailed information
is needed. Possible solution: promote the avalanche
problem, especially at danger levels 2 and 3, which
also are the conditions most fatalities occur. Streamline
the presentation of the avalanche problem according
to danger level and reduce overlap with the avalanche
danger assessment in order to reduce the complexity
for users. Reduce the amount of information to users
at higher danger levels. The danger level was rated as
important, but somewhat difficult to understand. It is a
simple numeric value, but is determined from relatively
complex and subjective factors, and is probably difficult
for users to understand and use.
7. Keep the EAWS symbols. The users considered the new
EAWS standard icons for the avalanche problems to
communicate the danger well, although the users were
not familiar with the icons.
In conclusion, our study has confirmed that the communica-
tion of the avalanche danger on Varsom.no is perceived to be
effective by the users. The results of the testing of the effec-
tiveness of different alternatives for communication of level 2
and level 4 avalanche danger suggested that the avalanche
problems communicated more effectively than the danger
level at lower danger levels. At the higher danger levels,
no significant difference was found between the alternatives.
The results suggest that a simple danger level is not enough
to convey the intended warning message on lower danger lev-
els; rather, the warning should present the avalanche problem
with a reasonable level of detail. At higher danger levels, the
results suggest that leaving out the advice and explanation
resulted in lower comprehension. For danger level 2 a user’s
competence mattered when it came to the rating of the alter-
natives, but not for danger level 4. Many users (67 %) and
most NAWS experts (77 %) rated the avalanche problem as
the most important element of the warning.
Based on the findings in this study, NAWS redesigned
the avalanche warning on Varsom.no: the communication
of the core sectors was improved (displayed in red signal
colour rather than vague grey), a location search function
was added, the display of avalanche problems was moved
up to just below the main message, the redundancy in infor-
mation between the avalanche problem, snow cover analy-
sis and avalanche danger assessment was reduced, the region
map was relocated down to the bottom of the page and the
mountain weather and snow cover analysis was restructured.
Norwegian users, experts and avalanche warnings were
used in this study, but we believe the methods and results
are important to the wider scientific community and AWS′
in other countries. The building blocks and communication
techniques of the avalanche warnings on Varsom.no follow
the standards of EAWS, as Varsom.no and NAWS were de-
veloped in collaboration with a number of AWS′ in Europe
and North America.
Our study sheds light on how effectively key informa-
tion is communicated in avalanche warnings. However, we
recommend more studies on communication and impact of
avalanche warnings, including in-the-field testing, testing of
the use of avalanche problems with regards to people and ter-
rain choices, and further development of methods for quanti-
fying the effectiveness of such communication.
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